Reconstruction of a Gribeuaval 4lb
The Gribeauval system, introduced in 1767, was an entirely new family of field artillery, consisting of 4-, 8-, and 12-pounder guns; a new 6-inch howitzer, and the ancillary equipment to support and maintain the guns in the field.
These guns were the backbone of the Grande Armee, and were a great improvement of the Vallerie system, but still, interchangability of parts was still something of a problem. Even after the simplification of Gribeauval, there still remained twenty-five different sizes of wheels. As well as this, eacht type of gun had a different size of caisson.
These problems came to a head during 1802-1803. Napoleon established an artillery committee, which included both Eblé and Marmont, mandated to simplify construction and reduce the number of calibres employed with the field armies. What came out of it was a new 6-pounder, which replaced the 4- and 8- pounders, and a new 5½ inch howitzer, sometimes called the 24-pounder. Along with these
new field guns came redesigned and improved caissons, limbers,
and gun carriages. The committee also recommended a new 24-pounder siege gun,
light enough to accompany the Grande Armee into the field, as well as a light
3-pounder mountain gun and a light 5 ½-inch howitzer, also for mountain work.
By the time the great wars of the Empire commenced, the design and production of both the new 6-pounder and the new howitzer was ongoing. A rolling programme of replacement was introduced, so as they were produced, the 4- and 8-pounders were replaced battery by battery. The 4- and 8- pounds were then placed in the arsenals, but subsequently saw extensive service, especially in Spain. The other recommendations generally never got beyond the drawing board for two reasons: there were excellent captured artillery pieces in abundance, and the demand for more weapons probably exceeded the French ability to produce the required number, especially after the beginning of the constant 'second front' in Spain from 1808 onwards. The heavy losses in Russia also compounded the problem. The manufacture of the new weapons and equipment never caught up with the Grande Armée's needs, and the use of both the older Gribeauval equipment and the newer 'System of the Year XI' continued through the end of the Empire. Interestingly, the fledgling United States Army adopted the Gribeauval system in 1809, but their artillery drivers were artillerymen, not troops of a different, but related, arm. The United States, thanks to consummate professional Winfield Scott, would also adopt the excellent French Reglement of 1791 for its infantry drill in 1814.
French 4lb Gribeauval barrel, mounted on an Austiran Lichtenstein system carriage. In the background can be seen the limber for this piece. The Austrian system was copied in 1801 by the french to create the System An XI
To accompany the technical
improvements of the artillery equipment came equally innovative doctrinal
changes, inspired both by Gribeauval, who had served with the excellent Austrian
artillery during the late unpleasantness of the Seven Years' War, as well as by
the du Teil brothers, Pierre and Jean-Pierre, who educated and trained Napoleon
in his formative years as a young artilleryman.
Because of the limitations of the
Valliere 'system' and the mental inflexibility of French commanders and
tacticians, the French artillery was seen merely as a support weapon that, once
emplaced on the battlefield, could influence only what was within sight and
range. The du Teil's wanted the French artillery to become a combat arm of
influence on the battlefield, equal to its comrades in the infantry and cavalry.
Consequently, they emphasized mobility, striking power, and accuracy, as did
Gribeauval. Guibert, in his Essai de Tactique, also agreed, to a limited extent,
as related by Robert Quimby:
'Artillery must be mobile and able to change its positions when necessary during the course of a battle, either to maintain its prolongations, or to concentrate on some decisive point. It needed to seek accuracy above all else, especially at long range. This was more important than speed of fire. As one shortened the range, which made accuracy greater, one could increase the rate of fire. Artillery should never be used in counter battery action, except when there were not troops to fire upon. The true targets of the artillery were the enemy's troops and the works, which covered them. Its purpose was not merely to cancel out the enemy's artillery but to cooperate with the troops in winning a decisive success.'
Jean du Teil echoed this innovative concept, and along with the new changes wrought by Guibert in equipment and mobility, they echoed:
'One will see that these
changes have rendered the tactics of artillery more skilful, its principles more
enlightened, more susceptible to being developed, and to being adapted to all
the actions of war. In considering the relations, which it can have with the
tactics of infantry, one can judge that, relying upon each other, they become
formidable, the one by the other. It results from this union and from this
reciprocal support, that our enemies will triumph with difficulty over these
great advantages, whose harmony so evidently constitutes the strength of armies.'
Du Teil defined both the 'emplacement and service of the guns' thusly:
'The execution of
artillery is the art of emplacing it, of directing its fire, of doing the
greatest possible harm to the enemy, and of giving the greatest possible
protection to the troops that it sustains. Troops and artillery ought to protect
each other. It is indispensable for the artillery to know the tactics of the
troops, or at least the results of their principle movements, and the effect,
more or less great, which it ought to produce on any manoeuvre, judging its [the
manoeuvre’s] importance, and of the necessity of accelerating its fire or of
changing position. It is not less important that infantry and cavalry officers,
who have to command all arms, and by consequence artillery, should know the
range of the various guns, the manner of emplacing them, and the general results
of their execution.'
Both the du Teil's insisted on the concentration of both guns and their firepower on a single point or target. If multiple targets were to be engaged, they should be attacked one at a time, or, depending on the organization of the artillery for combat, different 'batteries' might be given different targets, moving onto the next as each was destroyed or neutralized.
'Does it not follow further,
that it is necessary to concentrate on the principle points and upon the weak
parts which are most threatened, the greatest quantity of fire?'
'It is necessary to
multiply the artillery on the points of attack which ought to decide the
victory, relieving the batteries which have suffered, replacing them by others,
without the enemy's being able to notice it, nor to prevail from an advantage
which redoubles his ardour, and discourages your troops. The artillery thus
sustained and multiplied with intelligence, procures decisive results.'
'It is necessary to assemble
the greatest number of troops, and a great quantity of artillery, on the points
where one wishes to force the enemy, while one threatens attacks upon the
others. One will impose upon him by movements and false attacks.'
'…the conservation of
munitions is one of the most important objectives in the execution of
artillery…The principal rules for the serving of artillery were to proportion
the fire to the importance of the objective, to husband one's munitions, and
conserve them for essential and decisive moments.'
Napoleon generally allocated a double approvisionnement (basic load) of ammunition for each gun, between 300 to 350 rounds. The Grande Armée might go hungry, but it never would run out of ammunition. The closest it ever came to doing so was at Leipzig in 1813, when its trains were cut off from the main army. This was one of the reasons Napoleon decided to withdraw from this battle of attrition, not, as commonly believed and written about, because he was defeated by the allies. That only became a truism after the Elster bridge was blown prematurely owing to the incompetence and cowardice of a senior artillery officer and a colonel of engineers.