Artillery Tactics
Tactics, as developed and
recommended by Gribeauval and the du Teil brothers, were taught in the excellent
artillery schools. There was, however, 'no official regulations governing its
tactical employment' (although the Guard did publish one for their use in 1812).
Standard operation procedures were developed by both the corps artillery
commanders and the corps commanders themselves. Artillerymen generally attempted
to emplace their companies on slightly elevated ground; too high an eminence
would leave considerable dead ground in front of the position which couldn't be
covered by the guns, leaving them vulnerable. Generally, overhead fire was not
used with friendly troops. Fuses for shells were generally unreliable, and
premature detonations could cause friendly troops to turn hostile. Also, the
sound of the guns, and the whistle of shot passing over head could unnerve
untried conscripts.
A battery in action
c.1812
The tactical employment of French artillery could be considered reckless. Guns
were considered to be the 'standards' of the artillery company. Their loss was
as serious as losing an eagle. However, to gain a decisive advantage, guns were
risked by corps and company artillery commanders, and by Napoleon himself. Guns
would be 'fought to the last extremity', especially on defence. Artillerymen
would engage enemy assault columns 'head on.' French commanders would seldom
engage in counter battery fire, or an 'artillery duel'. Their targets were
the opposing troop formations, especially the infantry. If the enemy's
artillery was doing particular damage to friendly infantry and cavalry, or it
was appreciably hurting their own artillery, French commanders would mass their
artillery against the enemy artillery, knocking it out either gun by gun, or
battery by battery.
The fundamental tactical unit of
the Guard artillery was the battery (company) or ‘division’. Each company
comprised 8 guns, usually 6 12 pounders and two 5.5 inch howitzers. The
howitzers, however, were often removed and brigaded into howitzer companies. One
company was often broken up so that each company had 8 guns. Each 12
pounder had a 15 man crew and was commanded by a corporal. Each company had 1
sergeant major, 4 sergeants, one quartermaster-corporal, 8 corporals, 20 gunners
first class, 48 gunners second class, and two drummers. Two guns formed a
section commanded by a sergeant, with four guns being commanded by a lieutenant.
The company was commanded by a Capitaine. Three companies form a battalion
headed by a Chef de Bataillon, the regiment being commanded by a Major. Young
Guard companies were armed with six 6 pounder guns, which were replaced in 1813
with 12 pounder or 8 pounder guns.
Guard batteries carried a double
ration of ammunition. Each caisson held about 350 rounds. The 8 pounder being
issued with 3 caissons, the 12 pounder and howitzer five caissons each. In
addition to this, each battery would have a spare gun carriage and team, one
mobile field forge, and a tool vehicle with spare parts for caissons, limbers,
and gun carriages. In total, a battery on average would have 30 vehicles,
representing some 140 horses.
During the revolutionary wars,
artillery was deployed solely at battery level, with drill books relating only
to the use of an individual gun. The lack of instruction for artillery higher
than an individual battery severely limited the use of artillery en mass, which
was noted at the time, but repeated studies of higher tactics was satisfied only
some years after Waterloo.
The tactical use to which an individual battery could be used were many and
various. In defence, it would be a powerful deterrent to attacking enemy
infantry, the gunners always trying to fire into opposing infantry and cavalry
masses rather than artillery. In this way, attacking enemy formations would be
broken up and disorganised by the time they reached the French line. The sound
of the bombardment would also re-assure the French infantry.
In the defence of villages, the battery would be concealed by strong cover, if
available. Normally, the battery would be placed on the flanks in order to give
enfilade fire. The same tactic would be used in open country. Cross fires and
enfilades were foremost in every gunners mind, and the French, especially the
Guard, were masters of it.
Artillery was vulnerable against cavalry, and would seek refuge in nearby
infantry squares, usually firing from corners to give the widest field of fire.
Technically it was possible for a battery to repulse a cavalry attack alone,
gunners were always urged
‘never abandon your guns till
the last extremity. The last discharges are the most destructive; they may
perhaps be your salvation, and crown you with glory’
Twice in Germany during 1800, horse artillery counter charged the attacking
enemy cavalry, and gunners beating off enemy infantry hand-to-hand. Such
incidents, were however very much the exception. However, gunners were no more
universal heroes than the infantry
or cavalry. An overrun battery usually fell into enemy hands.
When used to support an infantry
attack, the battery would once again seek to obtain a position where it could
fire into the opposing troops flank. The closer the battery could get, the
better- get up close and shoot quick was one French artillerists' maxim.
However, this tactic required quick reactions to guard against sudden
counterattacks. To some extent the danger of this tactic could be overcome by
leapfrogging batteries forward in alternate sections or by approaching behind a
cavalry of infantry screen, and increased the surprise factor, which could often
rout an in-experience enemy on its own. A more certain method was the adoption
of the massed battery.
At Friedland, Senermont demonstrated that massed artillery could be deployed
successfully. Senermont massed 38 guns, including: four 12 pounder guns, four 4
pounder guns, 22 6 pounder guns, and eight howitzers. The battery was split into
three provisional batteries: a heavy reserve and two main units, each of ten 6
pounder guns, two 4 pounder guns, and three howitzers. The batteries were placed
so as to be able to cross their fire at a single point. The reserve was kept in
a covered position. Fire was opened at 400 meters, and after five or six rounds,
advanced to 200 meters. The two batteries were supported by an infantry
battalion and four regiments of dragoons. After firing 20 rounds per gun, the
batteries were advanced by prolong until they joined together at about 60 meters
from the enemies line. Rapid fire with heavy canister broke the infantry to its
front. After this route, the French Infantry were able to attack into the town
of Friedland, supported all the way by Senermont, firing into the retreating
Russians flank. Senermont lost 66 casualties and 53 horses. The artillery charge
was a startling feat of arms.
The Guard artillery , especially the foot batteries, was unique in the French
artillery arm. At Austerlitz and Jena, artillery concentrations were invaluable,
but were no larger than the size of a single division, introduced by Napoleon
when he became First Consul. The static use of artillery in this manner was well
known, but what marked the use of the artillery at Austerlitz different was the
use of the Guard artillery to fill the gap between the corps of Lannes and Soult.
The same tactic was used at Jena a year later. However the development of mass
artillery by uniting artillery divisions into a single corps, had an almost
insurmountable obstacle in its way, in the form of jealousy between divisional
commanders. Fancy new ideas like corps artillery tactics were all very well,
these men would argue, but without its artillery a division was locally
vulnerable.
It was only in exceptional cases therefore that the average corps would
concentrate its guns. If the concentration of artillery in line corps was not
being enthusiastically embraced, then a way around the reluctance of the
commanders had to be found. By increasing the artillery army of the Imperial
Guard, the concentrations of these guns could grow, since the Guard was free
from the organisational limitations of the line. From the start the Foot
Artillery of the Guard had been designed by Napoleon to intervene en masse after
the battle has developed, and hence it was not used in the type of desultory
outpost work on which the guns of the Line were often dispersed. At Eylau, the
Guard was able to assemble 40 guns, whilst St Hilaire’s division could only
muster 18, and Senermont had to be content with just 19. This was to be the
pattern for the role of the Guard artillery in later battles of the Empire -
the guard armed with 12 pounders providing the nucleus for ever bigger artillery
concentrations. At Wagram, 100 guns formed a massed battery, which convinced the
Emperor that only 36 guns or more could obtain a really decisive result against
the enemy. After Friedland and Wagram, Napoleon started to think in terms of
massing 80 to 100 guns, and to find these guns he turned to the Guard. It would
be the foot guns of the Imperial Guard that would intervene at the climax of a
battle in a direction thought to offer the greatest chance of decisive results.
The expansion of Guards foot artillery to over 100 guns was a deliberate act by
Napoleon so he could deploy an artillery corps en masse, under his direct
command, where and when he wanted the guns. Eighteenth Century conventions had
traditionally placed artillery batteries into a general pool of units, which
were then parcelled out to temporary corps commanders. Even with this method,
commanders could and did mass artillery instead of distributing it in small
groups along the line. At Marengo and Aspern-Essling, the Austrians employed
artillery en masse, as did the Russians at Eylau. The technique of massing
artillery was not unusual. What was unusual was that the French Army, as part of
Napoleons reorganisation of the army as First Consul into a modern division
structure, created semi-autonomous artillery formations, which were under the
command of smart, aggressive young artillery officers. These comparatively young
men were accustomed to the democratic air of the Revolution. They did not
hesitate to tell their commanders, " Let me go do this, it will
work...," behaviour which was discouraged in other armies of the time. Also
Napoleon and several of his senior generals were experts at maintaining the
offensive tempo on the battlefield, including the efficient coordination of
artillery fire. All of these factors, coupled with new, relatively lightweight
cannon of Gribeuaval and Marmont's reforms breathed new life into the French
Artillery, turning it into a potent offensive weapon.
The presence of officers leading and coordinating massed artillery formations
was one of several important factors in the superior performance of French
Artillery at this time.
The Russians were no strangers to massed artillery, yet only in 1813 were
officers commanding corps level artillery reserve formations appointed. Before
this, artillery reserves seem to have been rather nebulous affairs, made
available to army commanders to use however they saw fit. While this certainly
allowed for massing of guns, it did not allow for very much innovation or
independent thinking among the batteries themselves. It also prevented the
coordination among batteries, which results from central control. When Prussia
finally put their troops into the field in 1813, it was along the lines of the
new Russian organization, which was beginning to increase the number of
independent artillery officers and formations. The British Army and Austrian
armies at this time continued to use the old pool system, parcelling out
individual batteries to brigades or divisions. And while the individual
batteries were well led, there was little coordination among them.
Artillery tactics came of age. The Guard artillery was
no longer a reserve as at Jena, and could claim to be one of the great deciders
of battles. The object of the artillery was not to kill men or dismount guns in
isolation but to make gaps appear in the enemy lines, stop his attacks and to
support those launched against him. To achieve this, concentration was the
secret, only possible with the foot batteries of the Guard.