The Guard Foot Artillery in Action

The Guard Artillery at Hanau

The first spectacular example of the Guard artillery being used en mass was at Wagram, where towards the middle of the day the artillery was brought up to support the hard pressed army of Italy. Together the two units mustered 102 guns, and was deployed along a mile front, and succeeded in halting Kollowrath's advance against the French Left-Centre. These guns were then turned on the offensive to clear the Austrians away from the villages of Aderklaa and Sussenbrunn. The centre was held by Drouot’s heavy foot batteries and the light horse guns of d’Abovile on the flanks. The French engaged the Austrians in a duel creeping nearer to his line all the time. However, the Austrians brought down effective fire on the French Guns and Skirmishers, the guard horse artillery lost 15 guns before they could get into action. Within half an hour the Austrian guns had been silenced, and much of their infantry had retired from its advanced positions; but this did not amount to victory.

  The mass battery at Wagram was not as succesfull as hoped due to several factors; the poor layout of the battery in a convex formation rather than concave, with light guns on the flanks and heavy holding the centre all firing into a fixed point; the lack of cooperation between Drouot and d’Aoboville, and perhaps most importantly there was not coordinated infantry follow up to the bombardment.

The same criticism can be made of Napoleons reluctance to allow the Guard Infantry to exploit the breach made in the Russian lines by the massed artillery.

The development of massed artillery batteries firing at a single point represented the deterioration from the more flexible tactics of earlier battles. With massed artillery, battery commanders could no longer view their operation at a local level as they were used to, but were forced to fit in to an altogether higher framework of control and command, which on occasion did not live up to expectations.

  In 1813, the Guard artillery, along with the rest of the Imperial Guard became a major battle formation rather than reserve. Therefore the Guard artillery was increased with a particular emphasis on 12 pounder and 6 inch howitzers.

  Where ever the Emperor went, the Guard artillery followed. It decided the outcome of most of the battles of 1813/14, as it was able to be brought into action where and when the Emperor ordered. In Germany, the guns of the Guard played a decisive role in the successful battles of Weissenfels, Lutzen, Bautzen (where Drouot earned the promotion to divisional general), and on October 16 at Wachau where Drouot commanded a battery of 150 guns, the majority of which came from the Guard. From October 16 - 19, Drouot was at Leipzig fighting, sword in hand, in the midst of his Guard gunners. For this service, Drouot was made a Count of the Empire on October 24, 1813. He gained the victory at Hanau (October 30) in clearing the enemy from the road to France.

  At Lutzen, 60guns of the Guard artillery appeared from behind a masking ridge; stopped the victorious enemy in its tracks; and prepared the way for Napoleon’s infantry counter attack. However, anew weakness appeared in the use of artillery in this way, as the infantry quickly over ran the beaten zone cleared by the guns, resulting in only a limited French advance.

  Marmont's central attack at Bautzen was supported by 76 guns; at Dresden, the Guard was committed on the second day around Grosse Garten, and cleared the enemy in a wide zone to their front. However this advantage was squandered when the guns were ordered to retire. A similar experience occurred at Liepzig, where a mass of 80 Guard guns, including 32 12 pounders blew a convincing hole on the enemy line, but the advantage was not fully exploited.

  The Guard was more successfully employed at Hanau, where Drouot deployed 15 guns opposite the enemies main line. First he cleared the woods with two battalions of Guard infantry skirmishes, then defiled through them with 15 guns in such a position to take the enemies artillery in the flank. Behind the screen of skirmishes he deployed the remainder of the Guard artillery, totalling some 50 guns. Noticing this danger, General von Wrede gave his Bavarian cavalry orders to charge the French batteries, and were only saved by a timely charge from the cavalry of the Guard, namely Guards d’Honour and Grenadiers a Cheval. Drouot directed his batteries to fire over the heads of the French Cavalry, driving the enemy infantry back with heavy casualties. At Hanau, Drouot had 65 guns.

  In 1814, the campaign in France provided the Guard artillery with new opportunities to shine: La Rothiere (February 1st), Champaubert (February 10), Vauchamp (February 14), Mormant (February 16), Craonne (March 7), Laon (March 9-10). After Arcis-sur-Aube, Drouot was elevated to Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor (March 23). However, due to the speed to manoeuvre in the campaign, the foot batteries of the Imperiale Guard came up too late for most of the other battles or were obstructed by thick mud. At Bar sur Aube, the foot artillery employed double horse teams to move the guns at all.

  With the return of Napoleon in 1815, Drouot was commissioned to urgently draw up reports on the artillery and the organization of the Guard. His opinion was also solicited for nominations. The movement of troops went so well that just over a month later, by June 16, he received the order to "immediately march the Imperial Guard infantry, cavalry, and artillery to Fleurus." Drouot was in unison with his Emperor as he knew that war was imposed upon him by the fear which the other sovereigns maintained under the likes of Talleyrand, Fouche and others who had been generously promoted by Napoleon.

The Artillerie-á-Pied de la Garde was finally successfully deployed by Drouot at Ligny, where it battered the Prussian centre which contributed to the route of Blucher's Prussians. The final battle in which massed artillery was used was Waterloo, but here its success was hampered, as at Bautzen, by the wet ground, which not prevented the cannon balls from bouncing but also made it too treacherous for the easy manoeuvre of both guns and infantry.

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