Systeme An XI and the re-design of the French Artillery.

Paul L Dawson BSc Hons FINS

  Since the second half of the 16th century the French artillery had only used guns firing shot at 4, 8, 12, 24 or 32 lbs. The drawings of these guns, fixed for the first time in 1668, were modified by the order of the 7th October 1732, which only preserved the 5 first calibres. Then, after the Seven Years War and after a series of comparative trials carried out by Gribeauval at Strasbourg in 1764, the War Minister decided (19th Dec. 1764) that the only guns which in future should accompany an army in the field should be 12, 8 and 4 prs, and a few 6-in. howitzers of a new construction. The other guns were reserved for sieges and for the armament of fortified places. Also tables of dimensions determined and made uniform for the whole Kingdom the mode of construction of gun and other carriages.

  The idea of placing on a wheeled carriage a short piece firing almost horizontally hollow bombs or projectiles appears to have had its birth in England or in Holland. The piece received the name of “howitzer, haubitze, obus.” It had been adopted by nearly all European armies before the French paid them any attention, altho’ they had taken two of them at the battle of Fleurus. In 1740 Field Marshal de Belle-Isle, then Governor of Metz, caused experiments to be made with this invention which had been presented to him as absolutely new. 

For the campaign in Bohemia, Bavaria supplied the French army with some of these pieces. They served as models for those which were constructed at Donay in 1743, and after that howitzers regularly formed a part of all field artillery equipments.

Gribeauval’s drawings for the 12lb.

Gribeauval 12lb with limber, and barrel in traveling position.

  Gribeauval Limber for 12lb

  In 1774 it was ordered that the arsenals should contain always ready all that was necessary to form 8 field equipments and 3 complete siege equipments. This material was in existence in 1792 when war broke out; it was soon found to be insufficient and, notwithstanding the somewhat irregular activity which covered the national territory with factories, foundries and improvised arsenals, the French armies depended on prizes taken from the enemy as their principal resource. Thus the army

which crossed the Alps in April 1796 only possessed 30 guns; a few months later it had nearly 1200, of which 600 were field pieces. Now the calibres used in foreign armies, other than the Spanish army, were 3, 6 and 12 prs.; the French 4 and 8 prs. could not therefore utilise the  ammunition found in conquered places.

Gribeauval 12lb.

  What ever the merits of General Gribeauval’s artillery reforms of the 1760’s, the experience of the revolutionary wars of France, lead a group of influential French artillery officers to be critical of the equipment they were using. The main complaint was laid at the 4lb and 8lb. The 4lb was deemed to be of too small a calibre to be effective and the 8lb to be too heavy for its range.

  Marmont, in the 1800 campaign noted several problems with the artillery system then in used. General Griois in his memoirs (book 1 pages 128-130) who was a capitaine en seconde on the staff of the 4e regiment artillerie a pied, remembers Marmont taking the artillery over the Great Saint Bernard Pass and was placed on the staff of the artillery in Milan on 21 June 1800.  He notes that Marmont raised his concern about the existing artillery equipment to Napoleon directly in Turin during September 1800, and argued for a reduction in the different calibres of guns in use.

To this end, Napoleon formed a committee of Artillery on 29^th December 1801, and was charged with improving the equipment and material of the artillery arm in the most advantageous way possible. The committee was presided by general d’Aboville, the First Inspector of Artillery; the members were La Martillere, Marmont, Andreossy, Eble, Songis, Faultrier and Gassendi.

General Jean-Baptiste Eble                         General d'Aboville

General Andreossy

  Antoine-Francois Andreossy, (1761-1828), was one of Napoleon’s oldest colleagues, like many of the committee members, and other senior artillery officers. As well as an artilleryman, he was a diplomatist, who was born at Castelnaudary, in Languedoc, on the 6th of March 1761. He was of Italian extraction, and his ancestor Francois Andreossy (1633-1688) had been concerned with Riquet in the construction of the Languedoc Canal in 1669. He had a brilliant career at the school of artillery at Metz, obtained his commission in 1781, and became captain in 1788. On the outbreak of the Revolution he adopted its principles. He saw active service on the Rhine in 1794 and in Italy in 1795, and in the campaign of 1796-97 was employed in engineer duties with the Army of Italy. He became chef de brigade in December 1796 and general of brigade in 1798, in which year he accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt. He served in the Egyptian campaign with distinction, and was selected as one of Napoleon's companions on his return to Europe. Andreossy took part in the coup d'etat of the 18th of Brumaire, and on the 6th of January 1800 was made general of division. Of particular importance was his term of office as ambassador to England during the short peace, which followed the treaties of Amiens and Luneville. It had been shown (Coquille, Napoleon and England, 1904) that Andreossy repeatedly warned Napoleon that the British government desired to maintain peace but must be treated with consideration. His advice, however, was disregarded. When Napoleon became emperor he made Andreossy inspector-general of artillery and a count of the empire. In the war of 1805 Andreossy was employed on the headquarters staff of Napoleon. From 1808 to 1809 he was French ambassador at Vienna, where he displayed hostility to Austria, which was in marked contrast to his friendliness to England in 1802-1803. In the war of 1809, Andreossy was military governor of Vienna during the French occupation. In 1812 he was sent by Napoleon as ambassador to Constantinople, where he carried on the policy initiated by Sebastiani. In 1814 he was recalled by Louis XVIII. Andreossy now retired into private life, till the escape of his former master from Elba once again called him forth. In 1826 he was elected to the Academic des Sciences, and in the following year was deputy for the department of the Aude. His numerous works included the following: On artillery (with which arm he was most intimately connected throughout his military career), Quelques idees relatives a I'usage de I'artitterie dans I'attaque et . . . la defense des places (Metz); Essai sur le tir des projectiles creux (Paris, 1826); and on military history, Campagne sur le Main et la Rednitz de I'armee gallo-batave (Paris, 1802); Operations des pontonniers en Italie . . . 1795-1796 (Paris, 1843). He also wrote scientific memoirs on the mouth of the Black Sea (1818-1819); on certain Egyptian lakes (during his stay in Egypt); and in particular the history of the Languedoc Canal (Histoire du canal du Midi, 2nd ed., Paris, 1804), the chief credit of which he claimed for his ancestor. Andreossy died at Montauban in 1828.

  Jean-Jacques-Basilien Gassendi, perhaps one of the better-known committee members was the second oldest member of the committee and was a contemporary of the du Teil brothers. He was Capitaine of the La Fere regiment in 1782, but was under the orders of Lieutenant Bonaparte. Also a Lieutenant at the same time was the future General Lariboissiere.

General Jean-Ambrose Baston de Lariboissiere 1759-1812

 Gassendi was director of the siege train at Toulon, holding the rank of Chef du Bataillon. He crossed the Great Saint Bernard Pass and fought at Marengo, being made General de Brigade in September 1800, and then Inspector General of Artillery in 1805, a councillor in 1806, he was made a count of the Empire in 1809, a senator in 1813, he was disenchanted with Napoleon at the first restoration and was dismissed from the chamber of peers in July 1815 by the returned Emperor. Gassendi returned to the chamber of peers in 1819, as was fitting for a member of the ancienne regieme aristocracy. He died in 1828. [One cannot help but wonder if Gassendi’s disenchantment with Napoleon from 1814 onwards helped to colour his views on the System An XI, which were published in his 1819 Aide Memoire for artillery officers. As a member of the new Monarchical regieme, he had to be critical of the Empire or face persecution by the ultra royalists].

Jean Fabre de la Martilliere (1732-1819) was the oldest member of the committee. He entered the army in 1757, and was made Captain in 1772. He worked with Gribeauval and became the Inspector of the Royal cannon foundry at Douai. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1791 and General de Division in 1794. He sat on the committee, but was replaced by la Combe-Saint-Michel on 4th January 1802 when he was made a Senator. He would be Vice President of the Senate in 1804 and Count of the Empire in 1808. Martilliere was the only member of the committee to have worked with Gribeauval, and was perhaps one of the stronger advocators for retaining the Gribeauval system. Indeed in 1817 he published a treatise on the method for the production of cannons [Réflexion sur la fabrication en général des bouches à feu. Maginel, Paris, 1817.] and was essentially the Gribeauval treatise.

  The task faced by the committee was immense, as they had to completely redesign the artillery by critically examining Gribeauval’s system and then evaluating any changes to the system. The theoretical research began on 11 January 1802 and ended on 21 July 1802.

  General Fave was commissioned to carry out the work and offer his opinions to the committee, and reported that changes were needed. His principal faults with Gribeauval were:

1)      Changing barrel position quickly fatigues the gun crews. Therefore new pieces, which could be moved on the prolonge with out changing position, were required.

2)      Moving the ammunition box quickly fatigued the gunners and made lifting the carriage onto the limber cumbersome. Moving the ammunition box to the limber would make this task less fatiguing.

3)      If the guns crews could ride on the carriage, the foot artillery could deploy at the same speed as the horse artillery. Moving the ammunition chest could facilitate this.

4)      The 4lb was mobile but it lacked the ‘hitting power’ of the 8lb. proposed to replace the 4lb with a new piece but keep and 8lb and 12lb.

  General Gassendi was critical of this report, and was opposed to any changes to Gribeauval, and appealed to Napoleon, who became involved in the discussions.  Napoleon’s view is highly informative in the way that the committee should think:

  The artillery should have but 4 calibres, the 6, 12, 24 prs. and the 5½-in. howitzer. In this way we abolish 4 calibres.

We should add 3 prs. for mountain equipment. In abolishing the Rostaing guns, we get rid of stubborn beasts not worth the trouble they give.

3 prs. should be a minimum caliber

  On 2^nd May 1803 the committee reported back to Napoleon, the results of their findings. In brief the solution to the 4lb and 8lb problem was to base the new system on that used by the Austrians, though Fave mention’s influence from the Congreve system used in England, and introduce a 6lb in place of the 8lb and 4lb. The 6lb had just over half the effective range of a 12lb, the hitting power of the 8lb but was lighter than the 4lb. Indeed, the calibre of 98.5mm was the average between the 4lb and 8lb, and the tube was just longer than the 4lb (by 100mm), and the huge quantities of captured Austrian 6lb ammunition could be used, and was therefore seen as an economy.  Being based on the 4lb, there was also no need for encastrement, thus solving one of the main problems of the old Gribeauval 8lb.

  The committee proposed that henceforth the field army should be armed with 6lb and 12lb cannon, and a 5.6 howitzer, and for mountain campaigns a short 6lb, and a light 5inch howitzer. New caissons, new carriages, and new field forges were put into production.  Article 4 of the report details changes to the siege and garrison artillery. New 24lb 12lb and 6lb were to be introduced, new 324mm, 216mm and 152mm mortars, 405mm perriers. Gassendi was critical of these new weapons and complained that the new 24lb was not as good as the old one.

  Napoleon, was in favour of these changes, as he believed that Gribeauval was at error:

  The 10-in. mortar has been suppressed, and the 8-in. and 12-in.

Preserved. The 8-in., which throws a 40 lb. shell, is an excellent mortar:

it is the true siege mortar.

The 6-in. mortars appear necessary, both for the attack and defence

of places. These mortars, which do not weigh 100 lbs., have the greatest

effect in trenches and covered ways. A field artillery park should have

twenty of these which can be used with 5½-in. shell, and may be useful

against redoubts and villages and thus save the howitzers, the fire of

which is very destructive to their carriages.

The question of the 12-in. and 10-in. mortars is not yet decided.

The 12-in. throws a 150 lb. shell, the 10-in. only 100 lb. In this

respect the 12-in. is to be preferred. Since we have an 8-in. it is useful

to have one with far more power, but M. de Gribeauval had

abolished the 12-in. and adopted the 10-in., because he thought that the

calibre of 8 or 9 inches was the best for long ranges. The mortars which

were cast at Cadiz had less than 9 inches.

More experiments are still required, and if they confirm the old ones,

to the effect that the longest ranges are obtainable between 8 and 9

inches, we should then abolish the 8-in. and substitute for them the new

calibre. Of course the mortar should have a cylindrical Gomer chamber

and the lightest possible for short ranges and beds for long ones.

We should have thus 3 mortars: the 5½-in., the new model between 8-

in. and 9-in., and the 12-in.

A mortar shell of the new model would not weigh more than 60 lbs.

That is not a sufficient weight and would cause one to feel the want of

the effect of a 12-in. shell.

Long-ranging mortars are only useful at particular points of the coast

or in places destined to defend a particular point, for the fire is so

uncertain, long and difficult that it can be of no use at ordinary times.

It was on the occasion of the bombardment of Cadiz that mortars were

cast at Seville with a range of 3000 fathoms. The coasts of Flushing, Ile

d’Aix and Hyères were armed with these. These mortars, joined to the

special carriages which were given to the coast guns to enable them to

fire at 45o, were a sufficient defence to drive off the English whenever

they attempted to cast anchor in Hyères roads.

  Gassendi was not the only critical voice, but he is the dominant voice, and has coloured our view of this system, especially the 6lb carriage, listed under article 16. Gassendi noted in 1819 that:

‘The carriages made by M. Gribeauval have been reduced in weight and therefore strength’

  This point has been stressed further by modern historians, (eg Chartrand) that on campaign that the carriages broke up, and could not stand the rigours of campaign. However, I have found no contemporary source for this assumption. Indeed, the new carriages were lighter, but had more reinforcements. Gribeauval’s carriages tended to break between the two trunion positions, and the same place on the howitzer carriage, as it took most force, and was reinforced under the new system with iron strapping at this point. Indeed, Gassendi has always been seen to oppose An XI, but Eugene Hennebert writing in 1887 qoutes Gassendi as saying that the reduction of calibres from 8 to 6, was a logical step, and batteries were easier to organise and munition. Gassendi also supported the reduction of guns per battery from 8 to 6, a view shared by Napoleon, who wanted only four gun batteries.

The unit of artillery is the division (battery): for horse artillery 6

guns; for field 8. The officers, N.C.O.'s and gunners of a company are

sufficient for its service.

It would be better, were it not determined otherwise by the details

of artillery, to form a unit of 4 guns, because a battery of 8 guns is

already too numerous not to be often divided; but what forces the

adoption of the larger unit is on account of artificers, spare stores,

forges, &c. In taking a unit of 4 guns all that would be doubled; the

extra expense involved would not be compensated by the advantage

attaching to the 4-gun unit.

  In Spain, 3 divisions of Guard Artillery were attached to the Guard Infantry, each regiment having a 4 gun battery of 4 6lbs.

  However, if one compares the committee’s drawings for the new 6lb carriage, and that for the Gribeauval 4lb carriage, one finds that the carriage from the front to the aiming curve is the same size, the only difference being in the diminuation of the trail towards pintle plate. At this point the Gribeauval gun measures 8.5inches and AnXI 7.5 inches. The rear skids are more rounded and shorter. One can not see how the loss of 1inch off the depth of the carriage can make it fundamentally weak.

Again the new 12lb carriage was as robust, if not more so than Gribeauval. Gribeauval’s carriages had a very marked aiming curve on the top line, whilst in ANXI this was virtually eliminated. Also, the wood work on AnXI is thicker in parts than Gribeauval. The overall shape of the carriage changed, which enabled the 12lb to have great elevation than before, the trunion positions were moved closer together, and the metal axel had a wooden ‘shock absorber’ around it. This lack of elevation was another of Napoleon’s complaints with Gribeauval. The shape of the rear skids also changed. This new more rounded shape meant, that rather than having to have two men on hand spikes at the rear of the gun to lift the carriage for advance or retreat, it could simply be dragged, the rear skid acting like a ski. The old Gribeauval rear skids did work to an extent, but often dug into the ground. Practical tests carried out by Assocation Britannique de la Garde Imperiale for a UK TV documentary clearly demonstrated this, and it was found that the AnXI carriage was superior when being dragged. Lifting the carriage seriously fatigues the gun crew, eliminating this was a practical step forward in man management. 

  Napoleon however, appears to have been fundamentally in favour of the new carriage and 5.6howizter:

  The 6-in. howitzer is too wasteful: it consumes as much powder as a 24 pr.

shot. They have rightly replaced it by a howitzer of 5 inches 6 lines; this

slight difference of 6 lines gives a great advantage. The waggon holds 75

rounds, whilst that of the 6-in. only holds 50, and in supposing that the

5½ -in. shell be inferior to the 6-in. the question comes to this: which

would you rather have, one 6-in. howitzer or two 5½-in. ones. But the

5½-in. shell is already preferable to the 6-in. one. Gribeauval's carriage

was altogether faulty. It has been altered, and rightly so, for there has

been a gain of 100 per cent. in transport, and lightness given to both the

carriage and the howitzer. But the latter still requires improvement: it

should have a greater range, which might be obtained by lengthening it.

There should be two sorts of howitzers, one to combine with the 6

prs., the other with the 12 prs. The latter must have the inconvenience

of greater weight, so as to obtain the greatest possible range from the

form of the chamber, length, thickness of metal, &c. All these drawbacks

are amply compensated in a reserve howitzer by the range being

increased to the utmost. The field howitzers of the Boulogne Camp had

that advantage.

It is equally necessary that the existing 12 prs. should have an increased

range, not that changes in the gun are necessary, but in the

carriage, which should admit of greater elevation being given to the gun.

Parks should also have 12 pr. Grenades  which would

weigh . . . . to be used with the 12 prs. Every waggon should contain

some of these grenades in place of common shell.

This is contrary to Gribeauval's principle, which however is false.

There are a thousand circumstances in war where it is requisite to open

fire at a very long range, whether from one bank to the other of a wide

river, or to hinder the enemy from encamping and occupying a position

which can only be attacked from a distance. Finally it is a real

disadvantage not to reply to an enemy's fire. We look however to

artillery officers not to fire uselessly, for we pretend in no way to attack

the fundamental principle that to open fire at a long range under

ordinary circumstances is to burn ammunition and to destroy its effect.

Guns of higher calibre than 12 prs. are very useless. We have acted

wisely in suppressing the 16 pr. which the Prussians and Austrians still

drag about.

An XI 12lb carriage. The old Gribeauval barrel was retained under the new system. These plans match identically to the 12lb built to the new system held at Les Invaldies Paris, and demonstrate that these carriages were actually built and issued to the army. However, all inventories for the guns issued to the army make no difference between Girbeuaval and An XI we do not know for sure how many were issued to the field army

  Gassendi was also critical of the moving of the ammunition chest (Gargoussier or Coffret depending on which manual you read). Under AnXI, the chest was moved to the limber (avant train), where the driver was seated. The chest was also larger, so more rounds could be carried. However, Gassendi saw this as a disadvantage to the gun crew. Again, one wonders if this was a legitimate complaint. According to the 1786, 1791 and 1799 and 1809/10 drill manuals, when the gun was cleared for action (Approvizonez le Batterie), the chest was taken from the carriage and carried 20paces behind the gun and placed on the limber. If the chest is already on the limber, 20 paces behind the gun, would not this make getting the gun into action quicker?

  Auguste de Lespinasse writing in 1800 stressed the need for pack mules to carry ammunition. This view was also supported by Napoleon:

  A limber, containing but 15 rounds of 6 pr. and 6 rounds of shell, is

a very slight provision.

It is thought that the waggons of a battery should follow the guns, to

obviate the inconvenience of successive fire on issuing from a defile.

Two pack-mules, carrying 2 boxes of 12 pr. ammunition or 15 rounds

of 6 pr. each, or . . . of shells, could follow a gun without being in the

way or retarding the movement of the other guns. Every 6 pr. would

thus find itself with 60 rounds including the contents of its limber,

before the arrival of the waggon.

The advantages of two pack-mules per gun or howitzer are numerous.

The supply of the 6 pr. can thus be carried to 200 rounds, and that with

a single waggon. The waggon might keep out of fire, lessen the number

of accidents which throw disorder into a battery, and save the lives of

many men and horses. As every mule carries 24 rounds these would be

the first source of supply, and the limber would remain untouched, as

it should be, for the moment of retreat or as a last resource. The fireworker

would take the ammunition from a mule within reach of the gun,

but out of the line of fire; the other mule would be further in rear.

These mules might pass to and fro, deposit their boxes and go to the

waggon for new ones, an arrangement which would require that the

shells should be carried ready fuzed in the waggons. It would be an

advantage for the artillery and for the army to keep the waggons far

from the enemy’s fire, in ditches, ravines or defiles, which would cause

an army to be much lighter in its movements and upon the field of

battle. The disadvantage would be inappreciable in retreat, since as soon

as its boxes were empty the waggon might commence its retreat 4 or 5

hours before the end of the day.

Every division (battery) should also have 4 pack-horses or mules loaded

with infantry ammunition, so as to be able to supply the skirmishers

without having recourse to the waggons. The places where the most

infantry ammunition will be consumed will be woods, and hillocks where

waggons could not get and where pack-animals are of very great service.

Often even on plains the waggon meets with many difficulties: it

cannot move because the ground is too soft, and when after much

effort the gunners get their pieces into action, it is advantageous not to

tire the waggon horses. The more one sees of war the more one

understands the utility of having a fourth of the ammunition supply

carried on a mule’s back.

Given Gassendi’s and other senior generals concern’s over the new system, Napoleon ordered the cessation of constructing guns to the new system on 9 November 1805. A second committee was formed to discuss the situation. A report was presented to Napoleon on 10^th January 1809. They reported that the innovations of the An XI system had not lived up to their expectation and had created a logistical nightmare in having both the new system and Gribeauval in use concurrently in the same army and in some cases the same battery.

The Grande Armee in 1807 had 85x 8lb and 19x 4lb compared to 166x 6lb [104 gribeauval guns in service compared to 166 AnXI]. The 6lb was replacing the older system and was acting as a universal gun for foot and horse batteries. The army as a whole had 40x 12lb, so the bulk of the artillery were medium guns rather than heavy. It is interesting to note that a year later, assuming that the were few changes to the composition of the Line artillery, that the Guard had 48 12lb, the largest concentration in the Grande Armee. Also, when the committee which created System An XI sat, many officers wanted heavier howitzers, again it seems that the rather the new An XI gun becoming dominant the old Gribeuaval 5.6 was in use, 28 An XI, compared to 52 Gribeauval guns.

The committee suggested that the production of the new system should cease and return to the Gribeauval system to prevent logistical confusion and sufficient new barrels had been produced. However, nothing was done until a third committee was formed, in January 1810, nominally headed by General Nicholas Songis (1761-1810).  The committee members were the following senior officers:

Eble, [minister of War of Westphalia]

Lacombe-St-Michel, Jean Pierre (1754-1812)

La Comte Sorbier (1762-1827)

La Comte Andreossy

La Comte Dulaulay, Chalres-Francois (1764-1832)[chamberlin to the Emperor]

La Comte Lauriston

La Comte Gessendi [head of artillery at the ministry of War]

La Baron Seroux, Jean Nicholas (1742-1822)

Comte Lariboissiere

Baron Fouche de Careil, Louis-Francois (1762-1835)

Baron Hanicque (1748-1821)

Baron Saint Laurent, Louis Joseph Auguste Gabriel (1763-1832)

Baron Pernety, Joseph Marie (1766-1856)

Baron Senarmont

General Songis

Songis had been an officer in the Corps Royal d’Artillerie (1779), Capitiane(1787), Chef du bataillon Armee du Nord (1793) Chef de Brigade Armee d’Italie, faught Castiglione, made commander of the artillery park of the Armee d’Oreint, commanded at the siege of Saint-Jean-d’Arce, and was nominated by Napoleon as General de Brigade (May 1799), commander in chief of the artillery of the Armee l’Orient (July 1799), made General de Division (January 1800), and returned to France at the end of 1801. He was made First Inpsector General of Artillery on 1^st February 1805, commander in chief of the artillery of the Grande Armee and the Armee d’Allemagne (1809). He retired from the army, placed on half pay with a pension on 15^th June 1809 and died on 27^th December 1810. Songis, as one of Napoleon’s oldest comrades, felt that he had been overlooked by Napoleon. As Songis had retired, the committee was infact headed by general Lariboissiere, who was in the regiment de la Fere at the same time as Napoleon, and was one of his oldest friends, and succeeded Songis as First Inspector General in February 1811.

The committee, however, did not vote to totally abolish the new system, and retained the 6lb, hardly surprising given Napoleon’s view on this matter:

The 4 prs. and the 8 prs. have been rightly suppressed. Gribeanval

simplified and experience has proved the necessity of further simplification.

We have progressed in that direction. The 8 prs. and the 4 prs.

were often employed in the wrong place: the ammunition of 8 prs. was

expended where that of 4 prs. would have sufficed. It was a very

considerable loss if transport is considered, it was 2 rounds instead of

1. Often there were only 4 prs. when 8 prs. were required. There is no

line officer, nor even artillery officer, who can well grasp the

opportune moment and determine if 8 or 4 prs. should be employed,

and even if he could, he is obliged to utilize what he has at hand. A

single calibre is therefore sufficient for field work, then there can be no

uncertainty.

The 12 pr. in either system remains in reserve to be employed with

premeditation by general officers, either of the line or of the guard artillery

  Given their masters vocal support for the new system, a new 6lb was introduced. Gassendi and others had complained that the shot fired by the 6lb was too light at 130pounds and a new tube 18 calibres long (1775mm) rather than 17calibres long(1675mm), firing 150pound shots was put into manufacture. This in essence created a light weight version of the Gribeauval 8lb. Rather than building a new carriage, the carriage for the Gribeauval 4lb was re-introduced (in fact the new system was little used in Spain, and the 8lb and 4lb remained un use. The 12lb was too heavy, as it exhausted the horse teams, already malnourished by the scarce fodder in the Pennisula Campaign. This lead to more static battles, where the 8lb was the ideal piece, as it could be used for both foot and horse artillery. Indeed, the Guard Horse Artillery had a heavy battery armed with 8lb, so one wonders if the complaint that the 8lb was too heavy was in fact legitimate, though the complaint it took a long time to get into action due to moving the tube position (encastrement) took time was a legitimate complaint). The old 6lb represented nearly half of all guns in the army for the 1807 campaign, with the Gribeauval system 4lb and 8lb being used, along with 3lb of dubious origin. After Russia, the army needed re-equipping, and was equipped with the 1809/10 system, using 12lb, 6lb, 6inch howitzers and 5.6howizters.

A long 6lb produced in 1813 and capture at Waterloo.

  The army of Germany in April 1813 had 144 12lb, 646 6lbs, 44 6inch howitzers and 246 5.6howitzers, served by a grand total of 4,050 caissons. Perhaps another reason why the An XI system proved un-popular was that is was very similar to the system used by the Austrians, who were continually beaten from the 1790’s until Leipzig. Many officers resented having to use Austiran equipment, alabeit in some cases superior to French. The same is the case when white was adopted once more as the colour for the Ligne Infanterie. Politics, economics, and conservatism amongst the artillery high command, rather than common sense and judgement condemned the An XI system of artillery.

  In 1814, Gribeauval guns were taken for arsenals and place with the field armies as a matter of national economy.

  With the abdication of Napoleon in 1814, General Ruty, president of the Committee of Artillery carried out tests on the 6lb, in order to test its effectiveness. Construction was stopped until the committee published its report. They found that the piece had imperfections, and was abandoned, but more tellingly, the Royalist committee and the new artillery commander in cheif had objections to what was essentially a Bonapartist alteration to what was essentially a royalist artillery system. Napoleon’s support of the 6lb was legitimate, but the Royalists were turning the clock back to the time before the revolution when the monarchy was strong and all pervasive. Indeed, the Royal Order of 30 January 1815 which restored the Gribeauval system entirely stated that they were returning the artillery system of France to pre 1789. These officers were ignorant of artillery, as very few had actually been trained in gunnery. System An XI was considered as heresy by the Ultra Royalists, even though it did improve the French artillery arm. For example the number of wheel types was reduced from 23 to 6, which allowed for greater interchangeability. Eugene Hennebert writing in 1887, comments that General Fave ,and others supported the abolition of the new system because it was difficult to operate both systems together with out further changes to Gribeauval, and it was felt better to retain Gribeauval and restore harmony to the artillery high command.

  For the Cent Jours campaign, Napoleon used what ever guns he could lay his hands on.

  In 1827 Gribreauval was  theoretically replaced by the new Valee system of artillery, which re-intained the 4lb and 8lb and introduced the single bracket trail ala Congreve, as proposed by Fave in 1802. However the adoption was piece meal between, and it was not until the Royal Decree of 5^th May 1832 that Gribeauval was officially repressed and the new system adopted, but was not fully organised until 1854! Therefore, one suspects that some Gribeauval guns remained in service nearly 100years after they had been introduced. The smooth An XI barrels re-appared in 1853 when the new 12lb was brought into service, the barrel of which was an almost exact copy of the 12lb proposed by AnXI.

   The use of a single bracket trail in 1802, was deemed at the time to be unwise polticially as war with England was imminent once more. Sylvian-Charles Valee was educated at the artillery school of Brienne, became a Lieutenant in the artillery in 1792,  faught at Eylau and Friedland, before commanding siege artillery in the Penninsula. During the Cent Jours he commanded the artillery of Paris. In 1822 he was made Inspector General of Artillery, and three years later, based on his experience of the Gribeauval system began a systematic re-design of Gribeauval, making the guns both lighter, have a longer range and more mobile. Valee became a Marshall of France and Governor General of Algeria in 1838.

  The Valee system was boasted as the most complete re-design of French artillery since 1765. Rather than designing a new artillery system, which An XI attempted, Valee and Piobert mainly re-designed the carriages and limbers after the Congreve system. The barrels were essentially Gribeauval, made longer with an increased bore, but retained the stepped profile of Gribeauval, though without the reinforcing rings. The new system re-introduced the 16lb siege gun and Gribeauvals mortars. The new howitzers owed their origin to the new 5.6 and 6inch howitzers of AnXI than Gribeauval, in that they lacked reinforcing rings and were of comparable calibre’s.

  To conclude, the failings with Gribeauval system of artillery were in part solved by the new system of An XI, but not fully remedied until 1827. The 6lb of An XI was a modern weapon, and is notable for its lack of re-inforcing rings, this marked the piece different and superior to the Liechtenstein system.

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